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In the spring of 1974, Monte Mordaunt and his mother were solicited
to invest approximately $47,000 in accounts' to be traded in commodity
futures contracts2 by Incomco, a futures commission merchant (FCM).3 The
* Kenneth M. Raisler is the General Counsel, Whitney Adams is Deputy General Counsel
for litigation in the Office of the General Counsel of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion ("CFTC" or Commission). Maureen A. Donley-Hoopes is Legal Advisor to CFTC Com-
missioner Robert R. Davis. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the position of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or any
individual commissioner.
I. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, No. 3-75-68 (D. Idaho Sept. 8, 1978) rev'd 686 F.2d 815
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, -U.S-, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985)(discretionary accounts in
commodity futures are not investment contracts subject to federal securities laws).
2. A commodity futures contract is a standardized agreement to buy or sell a fixed
quantity of a commodity. The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA" or "Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ I-
26, defines "commodity" as including "all services, rights and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Thus, any financial
instrument or other interest can be a "commodity."
If a futures contract based on that instrument is traded on an exchange designated by the
Commodity Futures Tradiig Commission, the contract is subject to the Act's regulatory scheme.
Commodity futures contracts may lawfully be traded only through the facilities of a board of
trade, i.e., commodity exchange, which has been designated by the CFTC as a "contract market"
for the particular commodity. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 6h, and 7 (1982). The price of the commodity
deliverable under a futures contract is set by open and competitive bidding in a designated trading
area (often called a "pit" or "ring") on the floor of the contract market. Whenever a bid and
offer made in the pit correspond, a contract is formed. See generally Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d
283, 287 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1982); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1985) (both discussing
the mechanics of futures trading).
3. Futures commission merchants (FCMs) (commodity brokers) must register with the
Commission and are subject to record keeping, minimum financial and other customer protection
requirements. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6d(l), 6f(2), and 6g (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.10, 1.17-
1.39 and 1.55 (1985).
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trading arrangement the Mordaunts established with Incomco is commonly
called a "discretionary" or "managed" account, under which the customer
gives his FCM sole authority to make all trading decisions.
4
Since futures trading is risky and requires knowledge of complex and
technical factors,' many small public investors in this rapidly growing industry
6
elect to rely on such a discretionary trading arrangement. For example, a
recent sample survey of the growing number of "public" (individual, non-
commercial) participants in futures markets found that from 35 to 40 percent
of these customers in the stock index, 7 treasury bond, and corn futures
markets trade through discretionary accounts."
In 1974, Congress responded to the need for better regulation of this
growing industry by expanding the coverage of the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA or Act) to cover futures contracts traded in any "services, rights
and interests". 9 At the same time, Congress created the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC) as an independent federal
4. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972) (broker's discretion used to trade account for customer's benefit and
profit); In the Matter of Robert Haltmier [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,160, at 20,977 n.6 (CFTC 1976) (broker authorized to execute orders without prior
consent of customer for each order); cf. Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir.
1985) (whether broker has de facto control over account does not depend on whether account
is labeled discretionary). See generally Note, Discretionary Commodity Account as "Securities".
Applying the Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEO. L. J.
269, 269-71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as New Investment Medium]; Note, Federal Regulation
of Discretionary Commodity Accounts, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 872 n.7 (1981); Note, Discre-
tionary Commodity Accounts: Are they Securities and Does it Really Matter?, 38 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 843, 843-44 (1981).
5. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.55. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 31888 (July 24, 1978) (risks inherent
in futures trading); 50 Fed. Reg. 5382 n.14 and cases cited therein (Feb. 8, 1985) (risks and
mechanics of futures trading must be explained).
6. In 1974, when the Mordaunts opened their discretionary accounts, 27.7 million futures
contracts were traded. Futures Industry Association, Volume of Futures Trading 1958-1983. By
1984, volume had grown to over 149 million futures contracts. Futures Industry Association,
Futures Contracts Traded, December, 1984. The 1984 level was approximately 40 times greater
than that of 1958 (3.8 million). Futures Industry Association, Volume of Futures Trading 1958-
1983. The general public has become increasingly active in futures trading as the volume of
futures contracts traded has surged. S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982).
7. Contracts of sale for future delivery of broad-based stock indices are commonly
known as "stock index futures." In 1982, the CFTC and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) reached a jurisdictional agreement whereby the CFTC would be the sole regulator of
stock index futures and options on stock index futures while the SEC would be the sole regulator
of options on securities and securities indices. See SEC and CFTC Jurisdictional Agreement:
Proposed Legislation, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,096 (Joint
Explanatory Statement) (Feb. 2, 1982). This agreement was in effect ratified by Congress in
1982 when it enacted 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982). See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,601 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985) (discussing
jurisdictional agreement over stock index futures).
8. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS
ON THE ECONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS at V 7-16 (December 1984).
9. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 201, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). In
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regulatory agency to administer the Act, including a reparations program
for resolving customers' claims against their commodity brokers.' 0 Under
what is now Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Act, Congress gave the newly established
Commission "exclusive jurisdiction" over "accounts, agreements . . . and
transactions involving" commodity futures."
Notwithstanding this apparently preemptive provision, a number of
dissatisfied commodity customers have brought suit under state and federal
securities laws. 2 The Mordaunt case is illustrative." In May 1975, the
Mordaunts cancelled their discretionary trading account agreements with
Incomco after they had incurred losses amounting to $27,385.03 and had
paid Incomco commissions totalling $20,190.00.' 4 In October 1975, the
Mordaunts sued Incomco for fraud under Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) Rule lOb-5 1- and provisions of the Idaho Securities Act, 16 alleging
that, because their profits depended on the skill and efforts of Incomco in
predicting the market, their accounts were investment contracts.' The Mor-
daunts characterized their accounts as "investment contracts" because in-
vestment contracts are "securities" and therefore are subject to federal and
state securities laws. " Without addressing the implications of Section 2(a)(1)(A)
of the CEA, the district court accepted the Mordaunts' contentions and
awarded damages based on its finding that Incomco's investment solicitation
was false and misleading in violation of SEC Rule lOb-5. '9
The Court of Appeals reversed.' It reasoned that a common enterprise
must be present for an investment contract to exist and that the prosperity
of the third party must hinge on the success or failure of the investor in
addition to futures contracts traded in any "services, rights and interests," the Act also applies
to option transactions involving commodities subject to regulation under the Act, except for
options on foreign currencies which are traded on national securities exchanges. 7 U.S.C. § 2
and 6c(b)-(f) (1982). Futures trading, which previously was restricted to a handful of agricultural
markets, expanded rapidly in response to the Act's development of new futures and options
markets for precious metals, foreign currencies, and U.S. government securities. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Annual Report 1984 at 15. In addition, in 1982 Congress permitted
Commission-designated exchanges to trade options on futures contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (1982).
10. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). See, e.g., Myron v. Hauser, 673 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 1982)
(describing reparations procedure); 17 C.F.R. Part 12 (1984) (rules relating to reparations
proceedings).
11. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
12. See, e.g., notes 94-95 and text accompanying notes 107-143.
13. Mordaunt v. Incomco, No. 3-75-68 (D. Idaho Sept. 1978) rev'd 686 F.2d 815 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, .U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985).
14. No. 3-75-68, slip op. at 4, 686 F.2d at 817.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985) (prohibits fraud in connection with purchase or sale of
securities).
16. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1402, -30-1462 (1980) (governs regulation of securities, including
prohibition against fraud).
17. 686 F.2d at 816.
18. The term "security" is defined in Section 2(1) of the 1933 Securities Act, and Section
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to include, inter alia, any investment contract. 15
U.S.C. §77b(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. §78c(l0) (1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-
36 and 338 (1967).
19. Id. at 4.
20. 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985).
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order to have a common enterprise. 21 Since Incomco's prosperity did not
hinge on the success or failure of the Mordaunts' investments, the Court of
Appeals found that the accounts were not "investment contracts" subject to
the federal securities laws. 2 The Court of Appeals did not consider, however,
whether Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA requires that causes of action for damages
arising from discretionary accounts be brought under the federal commodities
laws rather than securities laws.2 3 Recently, the Supreme Court denied the
Mordaunts' petition for a writ of certiorari. 24 Three Justices dissented,
however, and suggested in their dissenting opinion, without any reference to
Section 2(a)(1)(A), that discretionary commodity futures accounts may qual-
ify as securities under certain circumstances.
2
1
This article examines whether federal securities laws may ever apply to
discretionary commodity futures accounts, in light of Section 2(a)(1)(A). 2,
The analysis begins with a look at the case law in 1974, when Congress
21. 686 F.2d at 817. See also infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
22. Id.
23. 686 F.2d at 817. In Mordaunt v. Incomco, Incomco contended, apparently based on
the exclusive jurisdiction provision in Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA, as amended in 1974, that the
CEA precluded a private right of action under the federal securities laws. Id. at 816. The Court
of Appeals rejected this contention based on Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382-87 (1982). Id. In Curran, the Supreme Court held that the 1974 amend-
ments to the CEA did not extinguish an implied private cause of action for persons injured by
violations of the Act. 456 U.S. at 382-87.
24. - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 801 (1985).
25. - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. at 801-03. The dissenting opinion in the denial of the
petition for certiorari in Mordaunt assumed that "[t]he SEC has in the past taken the position
that discretionary commodities futures contracts are securities." Id. at 802. Following the denial
of the petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC submitted a letter to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court which suggested that the dissenting Justices delete the reference
to the SEC's position on discretionary accounts. Letter from Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General,
United States Department of Justice, to Honorable Alexander L. Stevens, Clerk, Supreme Court
of United States at 2 (January 25, 1985) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Letter from Rex E. Lee]. The Solicitor General said "it has not been the
[SEC's] position that an ordinary discretionary account, where the broker tailors the trading to
the individual customer and is compensated only by sales commissions, is a security." Id. at 1.
The dissenting Justices in Mordaunt had cited SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp. and In
re Carlson in support of their statement concerning the SEC's position. 105 S. Ct. at 801-03;
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Carlson, 13 SEC
DOCKET 1104 (Dec. 12, 1977). The Solicitor General said that these two cases concerned naked
options, not discretionary accounts. Letter from Rex E. Lee at 1. The Solicitor General suggested
that the federal securities laws applied in those cases because the customers "were dependent
on the brokerage firms' managerial efforts to produce the revenues needed to honor the firms'
obligations to customers under the option contracts." Id. at 2. The authors have been advised
that Justice White has since modified his dissenting opinion to read: "The SEC in the past
seems to have taken the position that discretionary commodities futures contracts are securities."
(Emphasis added). Letter from Henry C. Lind, Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions, to
Maureen A. Donley-Hoopes (Sept. 19, 1985) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 30-150.
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enacted Section 2(a)(1). 21 The article discusses the legislative history of this
provision, with emphasis on the clauses that give the CFTC "exclusive
jurisdiction" and that preserve causes of action. 28 The article then examines
the judicial response to this provision and concludes that the application of
federal securities laws to discretionary commodities accounts should occur
less frequently as courts become more aware of the Act and its legislative
history.29
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2(a)(1)(A) WITH
RESPECT TO DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS
A. Case law before enactment of Section 2(a)(1)(A)
Before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, a° there
was substantial judicial disagreement over whether a discretionary commod-
ities account was an investment contract and therefore a security3' subject to
the federal securities laws. 2 Courts consistently assumed that they should
apply the now classic standard formulated by the Supreme Court in SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co.3" for determining whether an offering is an investment
contract. In Howey, the court stated, "[A]n investment contract for purposes
of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
27. See infra text accompanying notes 30-44.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 45-91.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 92-150.
30. Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389-1416 (1974).
31. See supra note 18.
32. Courts were in general agreement prior to the enactment of the CFTC Act of 1974
that a particular commodity futures contract was not an investment contract. See Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 520 n.9 (particular commodity futures contract is not a
security); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 669, 671 (C.D.Cal. 1973) (same);
Schwartz v. Bache & Co. Inc., 340 F. Supp. 995, 998-99 (S.D.Iowa 1972) (same); Berman v.
Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 360-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same). See also Golding
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 1182, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same);
Glazer v. National Commodity Research & Statistical Services, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341, 1344
(N.D. Ill. 1974), aff 'd, 547 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129, 131-32 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (same); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache
& Co., Inc., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973) (same); Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,601 at 30,573 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985)
(individual contract for delivery of a commodity has never been considered a security).
33. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. involved the sale of individual units of
orange trees that were conveyed by deed to the purchaser, in conjunction with a service contract
under which the seller (or a company other than the company controlled by the seller) cultivated,
harvested and marketed the orange crop, and remitted the profits to the investor. Id. at 295-
96. Although oranges, trees, and land are not ordinarily "securities," the Court held that the
offering involved a "security" within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 because it was
an "investment contract." Id. at 300.
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person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... ,.14 This test
subsumes within it three elements: first, the existence of an investment of
money; second, that the scheme functions as a common enterprise; and
third, that profits of the enterprise are derived solely from the efforts of
others." The crucial and most controversial factor in pre-1974 cases con-
cerning the application of federal securities laws to discretionary commodities
accounts was whether the second element of the Howey test-a "common
enterprise' '-existed.-6
One line of pre-1974 cases, following the reasoning in Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc.,37 held that a discretionary commodities account is not a
security. 8 In Milnarik, the Court said that Howey's "common enterprise"
factor required a pooling of interests or a pro rata sharing of profits
(otherwise known as "horizontal commonality"), and that discretionary
commodities accounts do not possess such commonality and therefore are
not investment contracts) 9 Consequently, the court found that the account
was not subject to the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933.10
Other courts prior to 1974 found that discretionary commodities accounts
were investment contracts based on the "vertical commonality" test set forth
in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises.41 In that case, the Ninth Circuit
held that the "common enterprise" element of the Howey test was satisfied
34. Id. at 298-99.
35. See Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521; SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974) (both discussing Howey investment contract test).
36. See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 30,573
(N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985); Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 255 (1983) (cases
are in disarray over kind of "common enterprise" required); Note, Securities Regulation-
Investment Contracts and the Common Enterprise Requirement, 43 Mo. L. REV. 779, 781
(1978) (split among courts primarily resulted from disagreement over meaning of "common
enterprise"); see also 58 A.L.R. FED. 616, 627-41 (1982) (summarizing cases which have applied
Howey test to discretionary accounts).
37. 457 F.2d 274, 276-79 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. See Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(discretionary commodities trading account is not a security), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc., 59 F.R.D.
129, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (same); Arnold v. Bache & Co. Inc., 377 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (M.D.
Pa. 1973) (same); see also Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654, 657 (N.D. I11. 1974)
(same); Glazer v. Nat'l Commodity Research & Statistical Services, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341,
1344 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1977) (same).
39. 457 F.2d at 276-79.
40. Id. at 275; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (registration requirements of Section 5 of
Securities Act of 1933).
41. 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See Marshall v.
Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 488-90 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (discretionary commodities
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by vertical commonality-a one-to-one relationship "in which the fortunes
of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and
success of those seeking the investment of third parties. ' "4 2 Under this
approach, dominance of the enterprise by the investment manager provided
sufficient commonality without requiring a pro rata distribution of profits.
4
1
It was in this atmosphere of conflicting case law regarding the application
of federal securities laws to discretionary commodities accounts that Congress
enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 ("CFTC
Act of 1974")."
B. The legislative history of Section 2(a)(1)(A)
In contrast to the approaches in which some courts fit commodities
trading within the Securities Act, Congress attacked abuses in commodities
trading by amending the CEA through the enactment of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.11 Before the CFTC Act of 1974,
the Commodity Exchange Act was administered by the Commodity Exchange
trading account is a security); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F.
Supp. 764, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. at 702
(same); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn. 1968) (same);
Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same). See also Koscot In-
terplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 478 (pyramid selling scheme is a security); Commerical Iron &
Metal Co., Inc., 478 F.2d at 42 (dictum) (discretionary account can be a security even though
contracts in the account are not securities); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d
132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970) (allowing churning claim under federal securities laws where broker con-
trolled account).
42. 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
43. See Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d at 482 (commonality depends on
efforts and success of those seeking investment); Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. at 489
(pooling among investors is helpful but not essential to commonality); Maheu, 282 F. Supp. at
429 (discretionary joint account may be investment contract even if funds are not pooled).
44. The confusion over discretionary accounts has not been limited to commodities
accounts. Similar confusion exists as to whether a discretionary account for the trading of
securities is an "investment contract" and therefore itself a security. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1235-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,911, at 90,633 (S.D.N.Y. March
20, 1981); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Alvord v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 (D. Conn. 1980) (all holding that discretionary
stock and stock option accounts are securities); see also Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,834, at 90,155-90,156 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 15, 1980);
Darrell v. Goodson, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. S EC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,349, at 97,325
(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 1980); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15-16
(D.Mass. 1981) (all holding that discretionary stock accounts are not securities). Cf. Morduant,
105 S.Ct. at 802 (White, J., dissenting) (conflict is not limited to discretionary commodities
futures contracts).
45. Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. RE. (CCH),
22,601 at 30,573 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985).
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Authority, a part of the Department of Agriculture, and applied only to trans-
actions in certain argicultural commodities.46 In substantially amending the
CEA in 1974, Congress expanded the definition of "commodity" to include
"all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt,"'4 7 thereby subjecting all futures contracts to
the CEA. Congress also created an independent federal regulatory agency,
the CFTC, to administer and enforce the Act's provisions.
4'
In addition to creating the CFTC and making the CEA applicable to all
futures transactions, Congress attempted to correct perceived deficiencies in
the old regulatory scheme, including confusing, inconsistent, and duplicative
application of state laws and federal securities laws to commodity matters.4 9
Congress addressed these deficiencies by enacting "the first complete over-
haul of the Commodity Exchange Act since its inception," to provide a new
and "comprehensive regulatory structure." 0 Congress made clear that the
46. 7 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970).
47. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). As the court in Mallen recently stated, the 1974 amendments to
the CEA "'expanded the concept of a commodity beyond the edible to the intangible." 2 COMM.
FUT. L. REP. at 30,573.
48. 7 U.S.C. §4a (1976). Congress intended that the CFTC be "comparable in stature
and responsibility to the Securities and Exchange Commission." 120 CoNo. REc. 34,996 (1974)
(statement of Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee Chairman Herman E. Talmadge).
49. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-49 (1974); S. RaP. No. 1131,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 40-58 (1974). In
presenting a bill to amend the CEA, Chairman Poage suggested:
[Tlhe time is now upon us for a significant change in the parameters of Federal
authority over the exchanges. Already, many State laws are exercising jurisdiction
over these same markets to fill what had become a vacuum of regulation. Varied and
often conflicting regulation such as this could become a burden on commerce, if it is
not already. With States seeking additional authority, litigants challenging self-
regulatory judgments, a weak system of Federal regulation, several recent examples
of abuse within the present futures structure and the exchanges .. . it is incumbent
on Congress to act, and act expeditiously through meaningful, thoughtful change that
is well reasoned and sure.
119 CONG. REc. 41,333 (1973) (emphasis added).
50. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). Among the many other amendments
to the Commodity Exchange Act in 1974 were provisions that: (1) granted exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction to the Commission (§201); (2) recognized new categories of commodity profession-
als-commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators and associated persons-and
required their registration (§§202, 204 and 205); (3) authorized specific Commission rulemaking
authority over registrants who are not members of exchanges (§214); (4) authorized administra-
tive reparation proceedings (§106); (5) required commodity exchanges to establish fair and
equitable arbitration procedures for claims against their members (§209); (6) authorized Com-
mission injunctive actions (§211); (7) required the Commission to consider the anticompetitive
nature of rules it approves (§107); (8) granted Commission review of exchange disciplinary
actions (§216); and (9) authorized the creation of new self-regulatory associations (§301). With
respect to options, in 1974, Congress continued the 1936 prohibition in effect for options
involving agricultural commodities (7 U.S.C. §6c(a)(B) (1976)) but vested exclusive authority in
the Commission to determine whether to permit the offer and sale or trading of options in the
[V/ol. 42:743
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purposes underlying the jurisdictional and other provisions were "to fill all
regulatory gaps" and "to avoid unnecessary, overlapping and duplicative
regulation.'"'
Section 2(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Section
201 of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, provides
in pertinent part:
That the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accbunts, agreements ... and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future
delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated pur-
suant to Section 5 of this Act or any other board of trade, exchange
or market .... 52
Section 201 of the CFTC Act of 1974 goes on to state that "except as
hereinabove provided" the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and other agencies as to other matters is preserved.
53
1. Exclusive jurisdiction
The legislative history of Section 2(a)(1)(A) suggests that Congress in-
tended to prevent any application of the federal securities laws to commod-
ities accounts.14 Although an early proposal appeared to preserve existing
SEC jurisdiction, that view was expressly rejected. The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission bill, H.R. 13113, originally passed by the House,
provided that
the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of transactions
dealing in, resulting in, or relating to contracts of sale of a com-
newly-regulated commodities. 7 U.S.C. §§2, 4a and 6c(b) (1976). If the Commission determined
to permit the marketing of these commodity options, the Commission was empowered to
establish the terms and conditions governing the offer and sale of these options. 7 U.S.C. §6c(b)
(1976).
51. 120 CONG. REc. 34,736 (1974) (remarks of House Agriculture Committee Chairman
Robert Poage); 120 CONG. REC. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge). Cf. H.R. REP. No.
1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974) (CFTC jurisdiction is exclusive and supercedes state and
federal agencies); S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974) (same).
52. 7 U.S.C. §2 (1982) (emphasis added). Senator Talmadge explained that the words
"any other board of trade, exchange or market" were included in Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA
to give the Commission jurisdiction over futures contracts bought and sold in the United States
but executed on foreign exchanges. 120 CONG. REc. 34,997 (1974). Section 2(a)(l) was renum-
bered Section 2(a)(1)(A) in 1982.
53. 7 U.S.C. §2 (1982). In addition to the caveat preserving the jurisdiction of the SEC
and other agencies "except as hereinabove provided," Section 2(a)(1)(A) also contains a
"savings" clause which preserves "the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or
any State." Id. See infra, text accompanying notes 72-84 (discussion of courts' jurisdiction over
commodities accounts).
54. See infra, text accompanying notes 55-91.
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modity for future delivery, traded or executed on a domestic board
of trade or contract market or on any other board of trade, exchange,
or market: And provided further, that nothing herein contained shall
supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the
Securities Exchange Commission .... 5
If enacted, this Bill would have provided for exclusive Commission
jurisdiction over all futures transactions but, because of the proviso, the bill
would nevertheless have permitted an inference that Congress intended that
the SEC would continue to have jurisdiction over commodity transactions
so long as the transaction was also a security."
The Senate, however, adopted a significant change in Section 201 which
the Conference Committee subsequently accepted.5 The Senate Agricul-
ture and Forestry Committee held hearings on H.R. 13113 and the Senate
bills, during which the president of a commodities brokerage testified about
the conflict in decisions among federal courts regarding whether managed
account agreements between commodity traders and their brokers in which
the traders confer discretion upon brokers were securities subject to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.58 Witnesses
55. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §201 (1974) (emphasis added).
56. SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1368 (10th Cir. 1976).
One witness testified during hearings on the 1974 commodity futures legislation:
Section 201 of the House bill, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Commission,
does not end the confusion in both Federal and State law as to who should regulate
the futures trading industry .... The SEC interprets some aspects of futures trading
as within the broad definition of a security under the Securities Act of 1933. The
committee will be doing a great favor to the industry and the American public if it
would change the jurisdictional provisions of section 201 to insure that if any
transaction relates to a futures contract and is regulated by the Commission, these
rules and regulations are preemptive of State regulations to the contrary and are
exclusive of other Federal regulations.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings on S.2485, S.2578, S.2837 and
H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 541
(1974) (remarks of John Clagett, President of Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc.)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings]. Cf. Review of Commodity Exchange Act and
Discussion of Possible Changes: Hearings Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1973) (statement of Reed Clark on behalf of New York Coffee & Sugar
Exchange, Commodity Exchange and New York Cocoa Exchange).
Although the House bill on its face appeared to maintain the application of federal
securities law to commodity futures, the House Committee Report indicated that this was not
its intent. See H.R. RP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974) (stating that other agencies'
retention of jurisdiction did not extend to transactions involving designated contract markets
and that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction would include securities subject to futures trading on a
contract market). See generally Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act:
Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAD. L.R. 1, 12 (1976).
57. H.R. Rap. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); S. Rap. No. 1194, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 35 (1974).
58. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 56, at 715 (remarks of Harold J. Heinold, President,
Heinold Commodities). Urging Congress to resolve the "difference of opinion concerning
managed accounts," this witness asked, "Having created the regulatory program, and formed
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also told the Senate Committee of the need to "change the jurisdictional
provisions" of the House bill to ensure that the CFTC's authority with
respect to commodity-related investment contracts including discretionary
commodity trading accounts would be plenary and exclusive. 9
Following its consideration of the testimony and the suggested amend-
ments provided by interested parties,60 the Committee revised the exclusive
jurisdiction provision in H.R. 13113 by adding an express reference to the
Commission's jurisdiction over "accounts" and other futures-related trans-
actions. 6' The Senate Committee also clarified the relationship between the
Commission's exclusive jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of other agencies by
adding the phrase "except as hereinabove provided" before the proviso in
H.R. 13113 concerning SEC jurisdiction. 62 The Committee explained that the
phrase, "except as hereinabove provided" would make clear that "the
Commission's [exclusive] jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as
well as Federal agencies... and Federal and State courts retain their juris-
diction."' 63 This version of the bill was passed by the Senate, 64 and was
a commission with the expertise and manpower to implement that program, should not Congress
vest in the new commission exclusive jurisdiction over all commodity trading accounts-managed
and regular?" Id.
59. Id. at 541 (remarks of John Clagett) and 680 (remarks of Glenn W. Clark, Professor,
Drake University Law School).
60. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974). See also STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 13113 at 30 (Comm. Print No. 3, 1974).
61. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1974).
62. Id.
63. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). The Conference Committee report
adopted the identical language suggested by the Senate Committee on Agriculture & Forestry.
S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35
(1974). As the court in SEC v. Univest, Inc., said: "The key phrase in this proviso is the
[phrase] . . . 'hereinabove provided' [which] do[es] limit the jurisdiction of the S.E.C. with
regard to commodity futures trading. In effect, [this phrase] transfer[s] jurisdiction from the
S.E.C. to the new Commodity Futures Trading Commission." 405 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (N.D.Ill.
1975), rem'd mem., 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977). Any suggestion that this proviso "somehow
negates ... [t]he grant of exclusive jurisdiction" to the Commission "is simply invalid." Id.
64. 120 CONG. REc. 30,468 (1974). In contrast to the clarifying language of the Conference
Committee Report, Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee Chairman Herman E. Tal-
madge's remarks in presenting the committee's recommendations were confusing, for while he
emphasized that the committee intended to give the Commission "exclusive jurisdiction over
those areas delineated in the act," he stated that it was not intended "for the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to usurp powers of other regulatory bodies such as those of the
Federal Reserve in the area of banking or the Securities and Exchange Commission in the field
of securities." 120 CONG. REc. 30,459 (1974). Commentators have suggested that "[t]he better
reading would be that the Chairman . . . wished simply to assure his colleagues that the SEC
and other agencies would retain their 'traditional' roles which had never included the regulation
of futures trading on commodity markets." Johnson, supra note 56, at 16-17; Van Wart,
Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 Cm. KENT L. REV. 657, 687 (1982).
This interpretation is supported by Senator Talmadge's acquiescence in Congress's deletion
of former Section 4c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970), which stated, "Nothing in this section
or section 4b shall be construed to impair any State law applicable to any transaction enumerated
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subsequently adopted by the Conference Committee.65
In discussing the addition of this clarifying language to the exclusive
jurisdiction provision, the Conference Report stated, "The clarifying amend-
ments make clear that ... the Commission's jurisdiction over futures
contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and includes the regulation
of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements, and commodity
options.. "66 The Conferees further stated that Section 2(a)(1) was in-
tended to "preempt the field insofar as futures regulation is concerned.
67
In explaining the clarifying amendments, W. Robert Poage, chairman of
the House Committee on Agriculture, said:
As passed by the House, H.R. 13113 makes clear that nothing in the
Act would supersede or limit the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities. The Senate
refined this language in an attempt to avoid unnecessary overlapping
and duplicative regulation.
68
Chairman Poage assured the SEC that it would continue to regulate the
stock market and was not divested of jurisdiction over "interests and rights
traditionally known as securities" such as "stocks, corporate bonds, warrants
and debentures. ' 69 However, Poage explained that to the extent that invest-
ment contracts were previously within the SEC's jurisdiction they would now
or described in such sections." See 120 CONG. REc. 30,464 (1974). Senator Curtis sponsored
this deletion "to assure that preemption was complete." Id. He described the bill as granting
the Commission exclusive jurisdiction "except to the extent the bill specifies that other Federal
and State agencies and Federal and State courts are to retain jurisdiction ... [and that] if any
substantive State law were contrary to or inconsistent with Federal law, the Federal law would
govern." Id. Senator Talmadge concurred with Senator Curtis, stating "I have studied the
amendment[,] ... agree with its import ... [and] urge the Senate to adopt it." Id.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1974); S. REP. No. 1194, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1974).
66. S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No.
1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); see S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974)
(CFTC jurisdiction supersedes state and federal agencies).
67. S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1974). With respect to state regulation of futures contracts, the House-Senate
Conference Committee stated:
[I]f any substantive State law regulating futures trading was contrary to or inconsistent
with Federal law, the Federal law would govern. In view of the broad grant of
authority to the Commission to regulate the futures trading industry, the Conferees
do not contemplate that there will be a need for any supplementary regulation by the
States.
S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
35-36 (1974). Congress carried out its preference for avoiding duplicative and potentially
conflicting state regulation by expressly subjecting commodity pools and commodity pool
operators, for the first time, to the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the Act. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 61, 6n and 6o (1976).
68. 120 CONG. REC. H34,736 (1974).
69. Id. at H34,737.
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be governed by the CFTC's jurisdiction if they related to futures contracts.
Poage stated,
I further understand, however, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has jurisdiction over other types of securities, including
investment contracts, and that the term investment contract includes
a broad category of arrangements and contracts relating to invest-
ments. In this area, there may be some apparent overlap between
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
intended jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
over trading in futures contracts relating, or purporting to relate to
tangible commodities. It was not intended that the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to investment
contracts be superseded, except to the extent that jurisdiction is
granted to the CFTC with respect to contracts for future delivery or
options relating, or purporting to relate, to tangible commodities,
or which are effected on a contract market designated pursuant to
section 5 of the act.
70
Thus, the legislative history of Section 2(a)(1)(A) suggests that Congress
considered and rejected permitting the application of the federal securities
laws to commodity accounts.
2. The "savings" clause
Section 2(a)(1)(A) also provides that "[n]othing in this section shall
supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States
or any State.' '7 This provision, read together with the exclusive jurisdiction
clause, has been interpreted by certain courts merely to oust the SEC from
jurisdiction and not to affect the jurisdiction of the courts over commodities
claims brought under the securities laws. 7 This interpretation is not supported
by the legislative history of this language. Rather, the legislative history
suggests that this language was added to make clear that Congress did not
intend generally to preclude private rights of action under the Commodity
Exchange Act. 73 Thus, courts may entertain commodities account claims, but
only if they are brought under the CEA.
70. Id.
71. 7 U.S.C. §2 (1982).
72. See Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1350
(D. Nev. 1980) (CFTC exclusive jurisdiction does not preempt judicial application of securities
statutes); Peavey Company v. Mitchell, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FEt. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,593, at 97,336-97,337 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 1983) (same); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp.
337, 342 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same); cf. American Grain Ass'n v. Canfield, Burch & Mancuso,
530 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (,V.D. La. 1982) (discussing cases which have allowed judicial applica-
tion of federal securities statutes).
73. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982).
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The House version of H.R. 13113 did not contain this clause. 74 Subse-
quently, various legislators raised concerns that the grant of exclusive juris-
diction to the new Commission might preclude claims brought under federal
antitrust, state contract, and state commercial laws. 7- Senator Dick Clark,
who had favored specific authorization of private treble damage suits under
the Act, said with respect to the House bill: "Unfortunately, the House bill
not only does not authorize them, but Section 201 of that bill [the exclusive
jurisdiction provision] may prohibit all court actions. The staff of the House
Agriculture Committee has said that this was done inadvertently and they
hope it can be corrected in the Senate."
76
Similarly, antitrust suits and judicial review of CFTC decisions would
be precluded under the House version of H. R. 13113. Congressman Rodino
expressed concern that:
this double proviso could possibly be read as an attempt to oust even
federal courts of jurisdiction. The first proviso confers "exclusive
jurisdiction" on the Commission for commodity transactions. Ex-
ceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction are carved out in the second
proviso without, however, referring to federal district courts....
[A]ntitrust laws are to apply to commodity transactions and, of
course, federal courts play an instrumental role in promoting as well
as protecting the national policies expressed already in the antitrust
laws. Arguably, too, if jurisdiction of federal courts were to be
withdrawn also, Commission decisions on commodity transactions
would be non-reviewable by the judiciary, raising . serious ques-
tions of administrative and constitutional law.
77
74. See H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1974).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
76. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 56, at 205.
77. Id. at 260. See 120 CONG. REc. H34,737 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage); 120 CONG.
REc. S30,459 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); S. RaP. No. 73, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1975). During the 1974 Senate hearings a representative of the Department of Justice commented
that the House bill, read literally, could "deprive [state courts] of jurisdiction to enforce State
contracts and commercial law relating to futures contracts." 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note
56, at 663-64 (statement of Keith Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department
of Justice). He noted "the fact that no substantive provisions in the nature of contract or
commercial law are included in the bill" as evidence that "the Commission was not intended
to adjudicate disputes between commodities brokers and their customers over contract terms or
similar matters." Id. He suggested revising the House bill so that "[j]urisdiction for violations
of the Commodity Exchange Act would then be conferred on the Commission ... while other
adjudicatory authorities, including State and Federal courts, would not be deprived of jurisdic-
tion to hear matters traditionally entrusted to them." Id. at 663. The Chairman of the Senate
committee answered that he also did not believe that "the House had in mind depriving either
Federal courts [of jurisdiction] in antitrust matters, or any other matter, and certainly not State
courts." Id. at 664. The remark "any other matter" appeared to refer to the "traditional"
matters mentioned by the Department representative. The Chairman of the Senate committee
asked the Department representative to assist the committee's staff in revising the language of
H.R. 13113 "to make clear that we don't propose to deprive Federal courts of antitrust
jurisdiction, or State courts' jurisdiction." Id. at 664. See also id. at 260 (remarks of Rep.
Rodino regarding preserving state courts' jurisdiction over contract and commercial matters).
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As a consequence of these concerns regarding judicial jurisdiction, the
Senate Committee amended the House bill to include the savings clause
disclaimer language with respect to federal and state courts. 7 The Senate
Committee Report did not offer an explanation of this provision's purpose.7 9
The Committee's chairman, Senator Talmadge, explained on the floor,
however, that the purpose of the "savings" clause for courts was to preserve
parties' rights of action under the Commodity Exchange Act:
The vesting in the Commission of the authority to have administrative
law judges and apply a broad spectrum of civil and criminal penalties
is likewise not intended to interfere with the courts in any way. It is
hoped that giving the Commission this authority will somewhat
lighten the burden upon the courts, but the entire appeal process
and the right of final determination by the courts are expressly
preserved." °
The enactment of Section 412 of the CFTC Act of 197481 further confirms
that Congress did not intend to sanction or preserve federal court jurisdiction
under the federal securities laws over claims regarding commodities ac-
counts. 2 Section 412 provided that:
Pending proceedings under existing law shall not be abated by reason
of any provision of this Act but shall be disposed of pursuant to the
applicable provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended,
in effect prior to the effective date of this Act. 3
78. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 386 (1982)
(discussing legislative history of savings clause); Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,873 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 1978)
(same); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 286, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (same); Jones v. B.C. Christopher
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 219 (D. Kan. 1979) (same); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,
459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same).
79. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974).
80. 120 CoNG. REc. S30,459 (1974). See also Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exchange,
Nos. 84-7328, 84-7770, slip op. at 5026-28 (2d Cir. July 5, 1985) (savings clause also ensured
that antitrust laws apply to commodities trading), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec.
2, 1985).
81. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 412,
88 Stat. 1389, 1414 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "CFTC Act of 1974"].
82. Less than four months after the CFTC Act was signed into law, the Chairman of the
SEC proposed an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act which would have provided:
No definition of "commodity" or grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the [CFTC]
contained in the [CFTC] Act of 1974 shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction of the
[SEC] or the courts of the United States or of any State with respect to accounts,
agreements and transactions involving a "security" within the meaning of this Title,
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, as amended, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as
amended.
See Johnson, supra note 56, at 26-27 (emphasis added). No Congressional committee supported
the SEC proposal and the provision was never enacted.
83. CFTC Act of 1974, supra note 81, § 412, 88 Stat. at 1414.
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Senator Talmadge and Representative Poage explained that actions and
investigations which were previously brought under the federal securities laws
and other federal and state laws to correct abuses in connection with
commodities accounts would not be abated "in order to prevent the creation
of any regulatory gaps, particularly during the time between the adoption of
this legislation and the full implementation of its provisions by the [CFTC]. ' 8
If Congress had intended for federal securities laws (and state laws) to
be used concurrently with the CEA, the "regulatory gaps" which prompted
enactment of Section 412 would not have existed. Construing the "savings"
clause as a preservation of federal court jurisdiction under the federal
securities laws would be inconsistent with Congress's apparent interest in
correcting the industry complaint that federal courts were applying federal
securities laws, albeit inconsistently, to discretionary commodity accounts.
Instead, as the above remarks suggest, Congress intended to change the law;
courts were now to apply the CEA to claims involving commodity accounts
and not the laws enforced by other federal and state regulators.
3. Post-1974 legislation
The language adopted by Congress in 1974 concerning the Commission's
exclusive jurisdiction over commodity accounts has not altered although
Congress comprehensively reexamined and significantly amended the Act in
1978 and 1982.8- In 1978, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
reaffirmed its support for the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over all
aspects of futures trading, stating: "[tihe basic conclusion reached in 1974
that there should be a single regulatory agency responsible for futures trading
is as valid now as it was then."
8 6
84. 120 CONG. REC. S34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); 120 CONG. REC. H34,737
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage). See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1974) (sets
forth language enacted as section 412); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974)
(same); S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974) (same). See also SEC v. American Com-
modity Exch., 546 F.2d at 1368 (legislative history indicates that SEC retained jurisdiction over
matters under investigation on effective date of CFTC Act of 1974); SEC v. Univest, 405 F.
Supp. at 1059 (Section 412 was enacted to avoid regulatory gaps between enactment and effec-
tiveness of CFTC Act of 1974); CFTC Interpretive Letter 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,257 (Jan. 14, 1977) (SEC could seek relief for activities it was investigating
on effective date of CFTC Act of 1974).
85. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 et seq. (1978); Futures
Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 et seq. (1982).
86. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978); see also H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1978) (other agencies should not have authority which duplicates CFTC
authority). In 1978, Congress also continued the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over
options involving commodities regulated under the Act by prohibiting generally, in the absence
of Commission regulations, the offer and sale to the public of commodity options. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 6c(c) (Supp. V 1981). Congress also continued to express its support for preemption of state
law. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 and 25-26 (1978). Congress enacted
Section 6d of the Act, however, which gives states statutory standing to bring civil actions in
federal district court for violations of the Act or CFTC rules. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (1982). States
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While Congress in 1982 made certain clarifications with respect to the
Commission's jurisdiction in other areas, Congress did not tamper with the
language giving the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over "accounts." In
particular, Congress clarified the jurisdictional boundaries concerning com-
modity pools by adding language to the commodity pool provision which
provides:
Nothing in this Act shall relieve any person of any obligation or
duty, or affect the availability of any right or remedy available to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or any private party arising
under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 governing the issuance, offer, purchase, or sale of securities of
a commodity pool, or of persons engaged in transactions with respect
to such securities, or reporting by a commodity pool."7
In contrast, no similar language was added to the Act with respect to
discretionary commodity accounts.,"
In 1982, Congress also inserted after the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the CFTC in Section 2(a)(1)(A) the phrase "except to the extent otherwise
provided in Section 2a of this title. ' 9 The new Section 2a further clarified
the jurisdictional division between the CFTC and the SEC over financial
instruments based on stock indices,9 0 providing that the CFTC would retain
are able to seek injunctive relief, writs of mandamus, damages on behalf of their residents and
other appropriate relief, except against clearinghouses, and floor brokers. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(I)-
(3) (1982). In addition, Section 6d recognizes actions in state court for violations of any general
civil or criminal antifraud statute of that state. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(7) (1982).
87. 7 U.S.C. § 6m(2) (1982).
88. Additionally, in 1982, Congress required a person associated with a commodity trading
advisor who solicits "a prospective client's discretionary account" to register with the Commis-
sion. 7 U.S.C. §6k(3) (1982) (emphasis added). Congress also clarified the parameters of
exclusive Commission jurisdiction vis-a-vis the states. Congress amended Section 6d to allow
states to proceed in state courts against persons registered under the Act, except for floor
brokers or registered futures associations, for violations of the antifraud provisions of the Act
and CFTC rules. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(8) (1982). Congress also authorized states to apply any of
their laws or regulations to activities which are not subject to the Commission's comprehensive
regulatory powers and to persons engaged in activities requiring registration or designation by
the Commission who have not been so registered or designated. 7 U.S.C. §16(e) (1982). Activities
subject to the Commission's comprehensive regulatory powers include exchange-traded futures,
foreign futures (except as specified by the Commission), authorized commodity options and
regulated leverage transactions. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 16(e) (1982).
In addition, Congress repealed the 1936 ban on agricultural options and permitted the
Commission to establish a pilot program in the trading of options in the domestic agricultural
commodities that had been regulated under the Act prior to 1975, subject to certain conditions.
7 U.S.C. §6c(c) (1982). And with respect to non-agricultural options, Congress added a new
Section 4c(f) which provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to any
transaction in an option on foreign currency traded on a national securities exchange.
7 U.S.C. § 6c(f) (1982).
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
90. See supra note 7 (explaining term "stock index futures").
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exclusive jurisdiction over "accounts, agreements ... and transactions in-
volving" stock index futures, while the SEC would have sole jurisdiction
over options on securities and securities indices.9 1
II. POST 1974 CASES CONSIDERING WHETHER FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS APPLY TO DISCRETIONARY COMMODITIES
ACCOUNTS
Since the 1974 amendments, many courts have continued to apply the
Howey investment contract test92 to discretionary commodity accounts with-
out considering whether Section 2(a)(1)(A) moots the question. 9 Most of
these decisions hold that commodities accounts do not satisfy that test and
hence are not securities. 94 The Fifth Circuit and several district courts in
other circuits, however, have held that discretionary trading accounts are
"investment contracts" as defined in Howey and therefore are securities for
purposes of the federal securities acts. 9
91. 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982) (emphasis added).
92. See infra notes 94-95 (cases in which courts have continued to apply Howey test). See
also Note, Continuing Confusion in the Definition of a Security: The Sale of Business Doctrine,
Discretionary Trading Accounts, and Oil, Gas and Mineral Interests, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1255, 1275-77 (1983); Note, Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures are not Securities
Absent Horizontal Commonality, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 675, 677 (1982).
93. As early as 1977 the CFTC's General Counsel interpreted Section 2(a)(1) to make it
"beyond serious dispute that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to all accounts, agreements and transactions involving commodity futures contracts,
both discretionary and non-discretionary, and that the exclusivity of its jurisdiction is not affected
by whether the account, agreement or transaction might otherwise be viewed as a 'security.' "
Interpretive Letter No. 77-2, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Coma. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,257,
at 21,371 (Jan. 14, 1977) (emphasis added). The CFTC did not, however, participate in any
litigation on this issue until 1984. See Memorandum of CFTC as amicus curiae, Kupke v.
Shearson/American Express, 2 CoMm. Fur. L. REp. (CCH) 22,757 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 1985)
(order dismissing federal securities claims regarding discretionary commodities accounts).
94. For cases holding that discretionary commodities accounts are not investment contracts
under a "horizontal commonality" approach, see Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222-24 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri.-
Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart,
Shields, 467 F. Supp. 311, 319-20 (S.D. Ohio 1979). Cases reaching the same result under a
"vertical commonality" approach include Meyer v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohl-
meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Mordaunt
v. Incomco, 686 F.2d at 817; Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1978);
In re Federal Bank & Trust Co., Ltd., 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 22,255, at 29,329-29,330
(D.Oregon June 4, 1984); and Blacker v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,459, at 93,661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 16, 1978).
95. See Rasmussen v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 97,203, at 96,589 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 1979);
Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 520-22; Moody v. Bache, 570 F.2d 523, 526 (5th
Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671-72 (N.D.Ga. 1983); Westlake
v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D.Ga. 1983); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey
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SEC v. Continental Commodities Corporation96 is most often relied
upon in post-1974 decisions finding securities laws applicable to discretionary
commodities accounts. Continental Commodities concerned "naked" options
on commodity futures contracts. Naked options are options that the writer
does not cover by either owning the underlying futures contracts or escrowing
a portion of the customer payments to acquire the contracts." The SEC
did not assert that the accounts involved in Continental Commodities were
discretionary or that they were securities.98 Rather, the SEC contended
that the naked commodity options were securities "since it was the defen-
dants' object to retain money owed to their customers as capital for use
in the defendants' business." 99 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found that
the accounts themselves were investment contracts because they were dis-
cretionary and met the elements set forth in Howey under a vertical com-
monality analysis. °0 In Continental Commodities the Fifth Circuit had no
reason to consider Section 2(a)(1) because the case was decided before the
effective date of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.
Thus, the CFTC had not yet received its grant of exclusive jurisdiction over
commodities accounts.' Moreover, the futures contracts that were the subjects
of the options in Continental Commodities were on commodities not covered
by the CEA until 1975.102
In addition to Continental Commodities, courts often cite Moody v.
Bache""- in support of the application of federal securities laws to discretion-
Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D. Minn. 1981); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corpora-
tion, 510 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D.Utah 1981) (dictum); Molis v. P.G. Commodities Assoc., [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 96,725, at 94,863 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1978);
Rochkind v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254, 257 (D.Md. 1975); Scheer v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,086, at 97,855 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 1975). Cf. Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufman &
Doty, Ltd. v. Newcomb Securities Co., 751 F.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (noting conflicting
results in application of Howey to discretionary commodity accounts); Clayton Brokerage Co.
of St. Louis, Inc. v. Stansfield, 582 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.Colo. 1984) (dictum) (commodity
account is a security if investor does not have control over it).
96. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
97. See id. at 519.
98. See generally, Brief for Appellant, SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d
516 (5th Cir. 1974).
99. Id. at 8. See also supra note 25 (differentiating SEC's position on naked options from
SEC's position on discretionary accounts).
100. 497 F.2d at 520-23. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
101. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 418,
88 Stat. 1415-16 (1974). The exclusive jurisdiction provision did not apply to conduct that
occurred before April 21, 1985, the effective date of the 1974 amendments. SEC v. American
Commodity Exchange, 546 F.2d 1361, 1367 (10th Cir. 1976). See SEC v. Univest, 405 F. Supp.
1057, 1059 (N.D. I11. 1975), rem'd mem. 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977).
102. The options in Continental Commodities were on futures contracts in silver, sugar,
coffee, platinum, plywood and cocoa. 497 F.2d at 518, n.5. In the 1974 amendments, Congress
expanded the list of commodities subject to the Act to include those commodities. See supra
text accompanying notes 47-48.
103. 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ary commodities accounts. Moody v. Bache also held that a commodities
account was an "investment contract" under the vertical commonality test.
Although this case was decided more than three years after the enactment
of Section 2(a)(1), Moody also was not governed by the Act because Moody
was pending on the Act's effective date.10 Congress provided in Section 412
of the 1974 Act that the 1974 CEA amendments would not govern such
pending proceedings. Furthermore, as in Continental Commodities, the
conduct at issue in Moody occurred in 1973, before the effective date of the
1974 amendments.
Consequently, the court in Continental Commodities and Moody v. Bache
neither considered nor had reason to consider the impact of the 1974 amend-
ments, since both suits were brought before the effective date of the exclusive
jurisdiction provision.I 8 Nevertheless, several courts have relied on Continental
and Moody as precedent for holding that Section 2(a)(1) does not preclude
judicial application of the federal securities laws to discretionary commodities
accounts. 10 6
A few courts, however, have considered the impact of the 1974 amend-
ments and have nevertheless applied federal securities laws to discretionary
commodities accounts. One such case is Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 10 7 in which the United States District Court for the District
of Nevada sustained a private action alleging fraud in the handling of a
commodities account under SEC regulation lOb-5.10
In Mullis, without any discussion of the relevant legislative history,°9
the court interpreted the "savings" clause in Section 2 as distinguishing
between agency jurisdiction and court jurisdiction, thus permitting the courts
to retain jurisdiction under federal securities laws. The court recognized that
Section 2(a)(1) precludes the SEC from regulating "securities whose dominant
feature is participation in trading futures."" 0 But the court found that "a
104. CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 418, 88 Stat. 1415-16 (1974). The plaintiff
in Moody filed suit on September 27, 1973, nearly one and one-half years before the 1974 amend-
ments became effective. See Complaint, Moody v. Bache, CA-3-7725 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
105. Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 22,601 at 30,574 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985).
106. See Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. at 342 (grant of exclusive jurisdiction to CFTC
does not prevent courts from applying federal securities laws to a security used for trading
commodity futures); American Grain Ass'n., 530 F. Supp. at 1346 (same); see also Peavey Com-
pany v. Mitchell, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 99,593, at 97,337
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 1983) (CFTC exclusive jurisdiction is limited to matters involving regula-
tion of commodity futures industry). Contra Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,872-22,875 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 1978) (1974
amendments to CEA preclude application of federal securities laws to discretionary commodities
accounts).
107. 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980).
108. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. §240.lOb-5 (1984).
109. See 492 F. Supp. at 1350.
110. Id.
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grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the commodity agency to regulate commod-
ity transactions" did not necessarily preempt "judicial application of security
statutes to a security used for trading commodity futures."' Although the
court stated that jurisdiction was preserved only with respect to claims
brought under securities statutes, '12 it nevertheless permitted a claim under
an SEC regulation.
A desire for customer protection appears to have motivated the Mullis
decision."' This is shown by the court's willingness to allow a customer to
avoid a preexisting arbitration agreement under the Wilko v. Swan "4 doctrine
which the court held precluded arbitration of the claim brought under the
SEC's antifraud regulation lOb-5.'" (In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court
held on the basis of section 14 of the 1933 Securities Act that a person who
signs a pre-dispute arbitration agreement does not waive his right to seek
judicial redress under that Act). ' 6 The Mullis court also assumed no private
right of action existed under the CEA. 117 This assumption also may have
111. Id. (emphasis added). The court appeared to base its conclusion that Congress had
not precluded courts from applying securities statutes to securities used for trading commodity
futures on the "savings clause" in Section 2(a)(l) and on a statement in the Senate Report
which stated that "Federal and State courts retain their jurisdiction." See 492 F. Supp. at 1350
(quoting S. REp. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974)). Conspicuously absent from the
court's description of the legislative history of Section 2(a)(1), however, is any reference to
Section 412 of the 1974 Act or the remarks by Congressman Rodino, Senator Talmadge and
others that indicate that the savings clause was not intended to create or preserve federal court
jurisdiction under the federal securities laws for commodities account claims. See supra text
accompanying notes 72-84.
112. 492 F. Supp. at 1350.
113. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Shank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 512 (D.Utah 1976) (courts
applying federal securities laws to discretionary accounts are motivated by a desire to give
commodities investors the same protections as stock market investors).
114. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
115. Mullis, 492 F. Supp. at 1361. Whether the Wilko v. Swan doctrine even applies to
SEC rule lob-5 and other claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 might be questioned
in light of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, __ U.S. - , 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985). In Byrd,
the Supreme Court held that the Wilko v. Swan doctrine does not prevent arbitration of pendent
arbitrable claims. - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 1241. The Court expressly declined to resolve
whether Wilko v. Swan applies to claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or regulations
issued thereunder. - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 1240, n.l. See also infra note 118 (some
courts prior to Byrd precluded arbitration of all claims if securities claims were also asserted).
116. 346 U.S. at 434-35; 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (Section 14 of 1933 Securities Act).
117. 492 F. Supp. at 1358. Mullis held that the savings clause in Section 2(a)(l)(A) of the
CEA, which the court used as the basis for permitting federal securities law claims in that case,
did not indicate a Congressional intent to preserve a previously implied right of action under
the CEA. 492 F. Supp. at 1356. The Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran specifically overruled that view, finding that the saving clause in Section 2 was
"direct evidence of legislative intent to preserve the implied private remedy federal courts
recognized under the CEA." 456 U.S. 353, 386 (1982). See Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,872 (E.D. La. Nov. 9,
1978). The enactment of Section 22, 7 U.S.C. §25 (1982), which explicitly provides for a private
right of action, further undermines Mullis's rationale. See Kupke v. Shearson/American Express,
2 Comm. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) 22,757 at 31,155 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 1985) (enactment of Section
22 effectively mooted concerns expressed by Mullis and other courts).
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played a role in the court's finding a cause of action under the federal
securities laws.'
8
In Westlake v. Abrams," 9 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, agreeing with Mullis only in part, held that
Section 2(a)(1)(A) doqs not preclude application of the federal securities laws
to commodity options, although it does preclude the application of SEC
regulations such as lOb-5.' 20 The court held that there was no cause of action
under Section 10 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act because that provision
only makes it unlawful to use a manipulative or deceptive device in violation
of SEC regulations and such regulations cannot, by virtue of Section 2(a)(1)
of the CEA, be applied by the courts to commodity instruments.' 2 ' Thus the
Westlake court dismissed the lOb-5 claim. However, the Westlake court
permitted the plaintiff to seek relief under Section 12 of the 1933 Securities
Act,'2 which provides relief against sellers of unregistered securities and
under federal securities laws establishing "controlling person,' liability.'23
118. 492 F. Supp. at 1349-51. Even if a cause of action under the CEA had been recognized
the Mullis court might have stayed arbitration under the "intertwining doctrine" which precluded
the arbitration of other federal and state claims in actions where securities claims based on the
same set of facts were also asserted. See, e.g., Smokey Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying intertwining
doctrine); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169, 1172-73
(11th Cir. 1982) (same). This doctrine was rejected, however, by the Supreme Court in Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. at 1241-44.
119. 504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980).'
120. Id. at 345. The court in American Grain Ass'n. v. Canfield, Burch & Mancusco
followed the reasoning of Westlake in deciding that a cooperative pool was subject to the
Howey investment contract analysis. 530 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (W.D. La. 1982). The only federal
securities law invoked by the American Grain plaintiff, however, was Section 10 of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78, which permits actions against any manipulative or
deceptive device in violation of SEC regulations. Id. Therefore, the American Grain court,
following Westlake, dismissed the case. 530 F. Supp. at 1346.
121. 504 F. Supp. at 346. See American Grain Ass'n, 530 F. Supp. at 1346.
122. 15 U.S.C. §771 (1982).
123. See Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77o (1982) and Section 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78t(a) (1982). The Westlake court doubted
that there was a cause of action under the CEA. 504 F. Supp. at 340. But see Westlake, 565 F.
Supp. at 1336 and 575 F. Supp. 58, 59 (N.D.Ga. 1983) (reinstating claims after Curran). The
court expressed concern that "should those causes of action [under the federal securities laws]
be extinguished, [the plaintiff] may have lost any avenue of recovery against an aider and
abettor or controlling person .. " Westlake, 504 F. Supp. at 345. In 1982, however, Congress
added aiding and abetting as a basis of liability in private actions under the CEA. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 13c(a) and 26 (1982). Moreover, certain standards of liability are available under the CEA
that are not available under the federal securities laws. For instance, while there is no
"controlling person" liability provision under the CEA for private actions, there is a "respondeat
superior" liability provision in the CEA which does not have an analogue in the federal securities
laws. 7 U.S.C. §4 (1982); see Note, Securities-Investment Contracts-Discretionary Trading
Accounts, ARIi. ST. L. J. 797, 807 (1979) (CEA adequately protects discretionary account
holders).
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The reasoning in Westlake leads to an anomalous result. 24 In Westlake,
the court allowed the plaintiff to seek damages based on the firm's failure
to register the account as a security with the SEC, even though under the
court's own theory the SEC did not have the authority to require or
administer registration.25 The Westlake court reasoned that Section 2(a)(1)
does not preclude judicial (as opposed to regulatory) application of the
securities laws to commodities accounts.
The Westlake court's view is difficult to reconcile with Congress's goals
in enacting Section 2(a)(1).2 6 For example, Congress probably did not intend
to allow private parties to invoke the federal securities laws for their private
benefit when it barred the SEC from doing so on the public's behalf.2" Rather,
as noted,' 2 8 Congress added "accounts" to the provision for exclusive Com-
mission jurisdiction to correct the problem identified by representatives of the
futures industry that in private litigation courts were in some instances applying
the securities laws to commodities accounts.' 9
Most courts that have considered the impact of Section 2(a)(1), however,
have concluded that it precludes the application of federal securities laws to
commodities instruments or accounts.' 30 The United States District Court for
the District of Utah was the first court to reach this result, in E. F. Hutton
& Co. v. Shank.'3' The Shank court permitted a private action under the
CEA and enforced an arbitration agreement, dismissing the argument that
the federal securities laws should be applied to commodities accounts because
the CEA allegedly does not provide comparable protections. 3 2 The court
held that, because of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC, "it
would fly in the face of express Congressional intent" to construe the
124. See Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (if SEC
jurisdiction is superceded private actions under federal securities laws also must be barred).
125. 504 F. Supp. at 344-46.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 54-85.
127. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 35. Indeed, nothing in the legislative history suggests
that private actions under the securities laws are to be treated differently from actions brought
by the SEC. Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
128. See supra text accompanying note 61.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 54-85.
130. See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,601 at 30,578 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985); Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,490, at 30,166 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 24, 1985); Gonzalez
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fairchild,
Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 736-37 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Gravois
v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at
22,874 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 1978); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865,
869 (D. Conn. 1977); E. F. Hutton v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Utah 1976); see also
Kupke v. Shearson/American Express, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 22,757 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
10, 1985) (order dismissing federal securities claims); cf. Marshall v. Green Giant Co., No. 4-83-578
(D. Minn. June 26, 1984).
131. 456 F. Supp. 507 (D.Utah 1976).
132. Id. at 513-14.
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requirements of SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. 33 "so as to include discretionary
accounts within the bailiwick of the securities acts and the SEC."'
34
In addition, the Shank court concluded that the protections against
fraudulent conduct given to investors under the federal commodities and
securities laws were comparable.' 35 The court rejected the argument that the
CEA is inferior because it, unlike the Securities Act of 1933 as construed in
Wilko v. Swan,'3 6 permits arbitration to be compelled. To the contrary, in
compelling arbitration in Shank, the court stated,
[T]his court concludes that it would be anomalous to hold that a
commodities account was a security for purposes of permitting an
investor to avoid an arbitration provision, while holding for all other
purposes that Congress did not intend that a commodities account
be a security subject to the provisions of the securities acts and the
regulations of the SEC .
37
Similarly, other courts have concluded that whether a discretionary
account is a security is no longer relevant. 3 s In Gravois v. Fairchild,
Arabatzis, '39 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana said:
The unambiguous language of Section 2 makes clear that transactions
involving commodity futures, commodity options and discretionary
accounts that deal solely in commodity futures all fall within this
exclusive grant of jurisdiction. [citations omitted] The purpose of
this provision was ". . . to avoid unnecessary overlapping and
duplicate regulation" between the CFTC and the SEC. [citations
omitted] [I]t is clear that, where applicable, the CEA now preempts
both the SEC and state regulatory jurisdiction.'40
And in Hofmnayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 41 the United States District
133. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
134. 456 F. Supp. at 513.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 114-116 (discussing Wilko v. Swan).
137. 456 F. Supp. at 513-14. The Shank court's decision to compel arbitration is consistent
with CFTC policy, which sanctions arbitration agreements and encourages binding arbitration
as a means for settling disputes that may arise in connection with commodity futures and
options accounts. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements have been held to be consistent with the
purposes of the CEA. See Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174,
1181 (2d Cir. 1977) (ordering arbitration of alleged CEA violations pursuant to preexisting
agreement). The CFTC has promulgated rules concerning arbitration that are designed to
encourage arbitration, while assuring that customers do not unknowingly or involuntarily waive
rights and remedies available under the Act. See Part 180 of the CFTC's Rules, 17 C.F.R. Part
180 (1984) and 41 Fed. Reg. 27,520 (1976) (notice of proposed arbitration rules).
138. See supra note 130.
139. [1978-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 (E.D. La. Nov. 9,
1978).
140. Id. at 22,873.
141. 459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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Court for the Northern District of California concluded that "[E]ven if the
discretionary commodity trading account is assumed to be a security, the
exclusive jurisdiction provision of the 1974 Act precludes application of the
securities laws to this action.'
42
Recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia in Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith'4 1 followed this
reasoning in dismissing a customer's state and federal securities claims in
connection with a discretionary account for trading stock index futures.44
In doing so, the court rejected those cases that have held that the jurisdic-
tional provisions and the savings clause in the 1974 CEA amendments created
a distinction between agency and court jurisdiction, thereby preserving a
private right of action under the federal securities laws, even where the
underlying transaction is a commodity. 4s The court found that the "savings"
clause in the 1974 CEA amendments was intended to protect then pending
SEC investigations and ongoing court proceedings, to protect state court
jurisdiction over contract claims forming the basis of a futures contract, and
to preserve private rights of action in federal court under the commodities
laws. 1-6
The Mallen court recognized the paradox of subjecting individuals and
corporations to regulation by the CFTC under the CEA, to suit by the CFTC
or states in a parens patriae capacity under the CEA, 47 and to arbitration
and reparations claims under the CEA, while also subjecting them to suit by
private investors under the securities acts without the interpretative regula-
tions promulgated thereunder.' s The court noted that judicial application of
federal securities laws to commodities accounts "would force careful brokers
to see that the investment vehicle is registered as if it were regulated by the
SEC at the same time that the board of exchange is seeking approval as a
142. Id. (emphasis added). See Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp.
865, 868-69 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that since the 1974 amendments SEC has no power to
regulate commodity options and that since SEC jurisdiction is preempted, no private liability
actions based on SEC rules or regulations such as Rule lOb-5 can exist). See also Gonzalez v.
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fairchild,
Arabatzis & Smith v. Prometco, Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kupke v.
Shearson/American Express, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 22,757 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 1985)
(all discussing impact of Section 2(a)(1)).
143. 2 Comm. Fur. L. RPp. (CCH) 22,601 (N.D. Ga. March 28, 1985).
144. Id. at 30,578; cf. Kupke v. Shearson/American Express, 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,757 at 31,155 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 1985) (dismissing federal securities claims regarding
discretionary commodities accounts based on Mallen).
145. See 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 30,574 and 30,576. The Mallen court found cases
which continue to apply securities law to commodities transactions inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Curran that the savings clause was added merely to clarify that the previous
provisos on regulatory jurisdiction did not remove all jurisdiction from federal courts. Id. at
30,577. The Mallen court noted that the minority in Curran had found that the substantive provi-
sion of the CEA remained the source of a litigant's rights. Id., citing Curran, 456 U.S. at 406.
146. 2 Com. Fur. L. REP. at 30,576-30,577.
147. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (1982).
148. Mallen, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. at 30,578.
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contract market under actual regulation by the CFTC.' 1 49 In the court's
view, this dual system of regulatory compliance caused by allowing federal
securities claims was antithetical to the Congressional purpose in creating
the CFTC. The dual system also defeated Congress's purpose because in
enacting the 1974 amendments to the CEA, Congress intended to avoid a
duplicative or contradictory regulatory structure) 50
III. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the 1974 and subsequent amendments to the
Commodity Exchange Act suggest that Congress did not intend for federal
securities laws to apply to discretionary commodity futures accounts after
1974. Accordingly, the rationale for the continued application of federal
securities laws may indeed be reliance on historical judicial precedent which
is no longer valid, combined with the failure of litigants and courts to actively
address relevant statutory authority. As courts gain a better understanding
of Section 2(a)(1)(A) and its legislative history, the application of federal
securities laws should occur less frequently and the issue of horizontal or
vertical commonality should no longer be relevant to cases involving discre-
tionary commodities accounts.
149. Id. at 30,577.
150. Id. at 30,578. The court in Mallen said that the "basic rule" of statutory construction
that "the specific controls the general" makes an application of Howey to discretionary
commodities accounts "faulty" since a Howey analysis applies "the most general terms" in the
federal securities statutes while such an analysis ignores specific terms in the jurisdictional
statutes of both the SEC and the CFTC. Id. at 30,577. The court paid particular attention to
the 1982 amendments to the Act, which it believed "fine tuned" the description of the specific
investments under each agency's jurisdiction. Id.
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